A
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The New Imperial System
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After the war the British
government undertook a concerted effort to bring the colonies more firmly under
its control. Prompted by an uprising of Native Americans led by the Ottawa
chief Pontiac, the British king issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. This
edict restricted European settlement to the area east of the Appalachian
Mountains in order to prevent new wars with the Native American peoples of the
interior. It was followed by the Currency Act of 1764, which prohibited the
colonial assemblies from using paper money as legal tender for payment of
debts. Another revenue measure, the Sugar Act of 1764, lowered the duties
imposed by the much-evaded Molasses Act of 1733, but sought to ensure that the
new tariffs would be diligently collected (see Sugar and Molasses Acts).
The law placed tighter administrative controls on coastal shipping. More
important, it provided that violations of the Sugar Act would be prosecuted in
the vice-admiralty courts, in which cases were heard by British-appointed
judges with no local juries. Another innovation was the Quartering Act of 1765,
which obliged the colonial assemblies to provide housing and supplies for
British troops. In addition, well-publicized discussions were taking place in
London about taxing the colonies for the support of British troops in Canada
and in frontier outposts. Reform of the empire was clearly underway.
Coming after more than
50 years of salutary neglect, the new regulations alarmed the colonists. Then,
in 1765 the British government headed by George Grenville acted to raise
revenue by levying, for the first time, a direct tax on the colonists. The
Stamp Act required them to buy and place revenue stamps on all official legal
documents, deeds, newspapers, pamphlets, dice, and playing cards. Colonists
strongly opposed the Stamp Act. In part, the colonists were alarmed by the
economic costs imposed on them by the reforms. Ordinary people had always been
lightly taxed in America and did not want their money to be used to support
British officials.
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The Ideological Sources of Resistance
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Educated colonists mounted
an ideological attack on the new British policies. They drew inspiration from
three intellectual traditions. The first tradition was English common law, the
centuries-old body of legal rules and procedures that protected the king’s
subjects against arbitrary acts by other subjects or by the government.
A second major intellectual
resource was the Age of Enlightenment in Europe during the 18th century. Unlike
common-law attorneys, who valued precedent, Enlightenment philosophers
questioned the past and appealed to reason. Many of them followed 17th-century
English philosopher John Locke in believing that all individuals possessed
certain “natural rights”—such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of property—and
that it was the responsibility of government to protect those rights.
The English political
tradition provided a third ideological basis for the American resistance. Early
English Whigs had resisted the arbitrary power exercised by the Stuart kings
before 1689 and had sought to limit the authority of the Crown and to increase
the power of Parliament. Their ideas had appealed to many members of the
colonial assemblies, who faced powerful governors appointed by the king.
Then, in the decades after
1720, many educated Americans followed arguments in England that attacked the
power of government financiers, condemned the idea of standing armies, and
accused the king and his ministers of manipulating Parliament through patronage
and bribes. To these Americans, the Stamp Act was not simply an economic
measure to defray the cost of the American garrisons. The colonists believed
that Britain was responsible for external matters but the colonial assemblies
legislated internal affairs. Therefore, the Stamp Act represented a cunning
attempt by Britain to seize control of taxation from the representative
colonial assemblies and to tax the colonists without giving them representation
in government.
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The Stamp Act Crisis
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American opposition to
the Stamp Act began shortly after its passage in March 1765. Patrick Henry of
Virginia urged the House of Burgesses to condemn the Stamp Act. The
Massachusetts assembly called for an intercolonial meeting, and a Stamp Act
Congress met in New York City in October 1765. Delegates from nine colonies
attended, and petitioned the king for repeal of the act, denouncing it as
taxation without representation. Many British merchants joined in this appeal.
Their exports of manufactures to the colonies had increased markedly since 1750
and they feared the effects of American refusal to pay commercial debts
amounting to millions of pounds.
However, the broader issues
at stake were temporarily obscured by the drama of immediate events. Some
Americans responded with violence to the new British measures of taxation and
control. On October 31, the day before the Stamp Act was to go into effect, 200
merchants in New York City vowed to stop importing British goods, beginning the
First Nonimportation Movement. Then they joined storekeepers, artisans,
sailors, and laborers in a mass protest meeting. On the next night, 2,000
residents surrounded the fort where the stamps were being guarded and then
plundered the house of a British officer. These mob actions prompted the
lieutenant governor to ask General Thomas Gage, the British military commander
in North America, to rout the protesters by force.
Similar situations occurred
in Philadelphia, Albany, and Charleston. Local merchants joined in
nonimportation agreements. Groups of artisans, calling themselves Sons of
Liberty, forcibly prevented the distribution of stamps and forced the
resignation of the stamp collectors. In Boston, a mob destroyed the house of
Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson. The colonial elite—merchants, planters,
assembly leaders—did not condemn this resort to violence; some even encouraged
it. Nearly everywhere, British authority was challenged, and the imperial
forces lacked the power or the determination to prevail.
Pressure from the British
merchants, who feared the nonimportation movement, persuaded a new British
ministry, led by Prime Minister Charles Wentworth, Marquess of Rockingham, to
repeal the Stamp Act in 1766. However, Parliament enacted a Declaratory Act
that restated its traditional claim to legislate for and to tax the colonists.
As Chief Justice William Murray, later 1st earl of Mansfield, stated: “The
British legislature ... has the authority to bind every part and every subject
without the least distinction, whether such subjects have the right to vote or
not.”
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The Townshend Acts
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Mansfield’s argument was
directed against the colonial position of no taxation without representation.
Colonists who protested the taxes distinguished between taxes designed to raise
money, which they opposed, and duties intended primarily to regulate trade,
which the colonists had accepted, at least in principle, since the Molasses Act
of 1733.
This distinction between
revenue and regulation was subtle and somewhat artificial. And it was misinterpreted
by Charles Townshend, longtime critic of the American assemblies and now
chancellor of the Exchequer in the government headed by William Pitt. Townshend
believed that the colonists were objecting to internal taxes, such as the Stamp
Act, but not to external taxes on trade. Consequently, he assumed that the
colonists would accept external taxes. The Townshend Acts, which were passed in
1767, placed duties on colonial imports of lead, glass, paint, paper, and tea.
This act also specified that the revenue was to be used not only to support
British troops in America but also to provide salaries for royal officials who
would collect taxes. Such funding would make these officials financially
independent of the colonial assemblies.
This attempt to raise
revenue through trade duties and to circumvent American control of imperial
officials angered many colonial leaders. John Dickinson argued in his
influential Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (1767) that the
Townshend duties were “not for the regulation of trade ... but for the single
purpose of levying money upon us.” Bolstered by such arguments, the colonists
opposed the taxes, not with the violence of 1765, which ended with the repeal
of the Stamp Act, but with a new boycott of British goods, the Second
Nonimportation Movement.
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Economic and Moral Upheaval
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The Americans’ determined
resistance to the Townshend Acts resulted, in part, from a profound transition
in the colonial economy. Before 1754 the colonists had earned enough from their
exports to pay for their imports from Great Britain. Then, British military
expenditures in America during the French and Indian War bolstered the incomes
of many colonists and unleashed a wave of spending for consumer items:
equipment for their farms and all kinds of household goods—including cloth,
blankets, china, and cooking utensils. British merchant houses aided this spree
of consumption by extending to American traders a full year’s credit, instead
of the traditional six months. The mainland colonists soon accounted for 20
percent of all British exports and had gone deeply into debt.
At the end of the war
in 1763, the boom came to an abrupt end. The postwar recession brought
bankruptcy and disgrace to those Americans who had overextended their
commitments and brought hard economic times to nearly everyone else. This
financial hardship generated opposition to the Stamp Act in 1765, especially
among urban artisans. They had suffered from the competition of low-priced
British manufactures and now feared higher taxes. Similar economic pressures
fueled resistance to the Townshend Acts in 1767.
Americans also had moralistic
reasons for calling a halt to the mass importation of European goods.
Extravagant expenditures on luxury items—fancy carpets and carriages, elegant
clothes and furniture—produced calls for a return to more frugal living
standards. In New England, where Puritan influence was strongest, excessive
consumption and debt was seen as a moral failing that inevitably led to a
weakening of character.
American women, especially
religious women, added their support to the nonimportation movement. Ordinarily
women were excluded from prominent roles in political affairs, but the boycotts
prompted a more sustained involvement by women in the public world. In Providence,
Rhode Island, during the Stamp Act crisis, 18 “Daughters of Liberty” met to
spin yarn for cloth, to avoid purchasing any cloth from British manufacturers.
To protest the Townshend Acts, a much larger group of religious women in New
England organized dozens of spinning matches, bees, and demonstrations at the
homes of their ministers. Some gatherings were openly patriotic, such as that
at Berwick, Maine, where the spinners “as true Daughters of Liberty” celebrated
American goods, “drinking rye coffee and dining on bear venison.” But many more
women combined support for nonimportation with charitable work by coming
together to spin flax and wool, which they donated to their ministers and needy
members of the community.
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Constitutional Conflict
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While confrontations over
taxes and reforms were serious, the bonds uniting the colonies and Britain were
still strong. Peace and unity were still possible. American diplomat Benjamin
Franklin declared in 1769 that the British ministry should “Repeal the laws,
Renounce the Right, Recall the troops, Refund the money, and Return to the old
method of requisition.” Late in that year the British government, now directed
by Lord Frederick North, the new prime minister and ally of King George III,
went part way toward meeting these demands. Under the pressure of the American
economic boycott, and a sharp drop in British exports, Parliament agreed to the
repeal of most of the Townshend Acts. However, the ministry did not recall the
British troops from any of the colonies and showed no disposition to return to
the pre-1763 imperial system. Indeed, Parliament reasserted its authority to
legislate for and to tax the colonies, retaining the tax on tea as a symbol of
its supremacy.
The long debate over taxes
clarified the fundamental constitutional questions at stake and posed the
political issue in stark terms. “I know of no line that can be drawn between
the supreme authority of Parliament and the total independence of the
colonies,” declared Thomas Hutchinson, the American-born governor of
Massachusetts, early in the 1770s. A committee of the Massachusetts assembly
accepted Hutchinson’s challenge and drew the obvious, if nearly unthinkable,
conclusion: “If there be no such line,” then the colonies would have to be “independent.”
But the committee proposed a solution: If Britain and its American colonies
were united by the king as their “one head and common sovereign,” then they
could “live happily in that connection,” retaining their own semiautonomous
assemblies.
This solution would have
required Parliament to renounce its claims to sovereign power in America and
was almost unthinkable given its quest for authority. Moreover, two violent
incidents showed how difficult it would be to achieve any peaceful constitutional
compromise. In Boston in 1770 British troops fired on an unruly mob, killing
five people, an event known as the Boston Massacre. Two years later, a Rhode
Island mob destroyed a British customs ship, the Gaspée, wounding its
captain in the process. In both cases, the British ministry declined to take a
strong stand, hoping that time and patience would resolve the imperial crisis.
Many members of Parliament demanded a more aggressive stance: American
violence, they said, should be met with British force.
These incidents also played
into the hands of those Americans who favored independence. Following the Stamp
Act crisis, the Sons of Liberty in the various colonial towns were in contact
with each other. More assertive leaders of the colonial assemblies also corresponded,
and gradually an organized Patriot movement developed. Following the Gaspée
incident, Boston patriot Samuel Adams persuaded the Massachusetts assembly to
establish a formal Committee of Correspondence, and Patriot leaders in the
assemblies of Virginia and the other colonies soon followed suit. These
committees exchanged information and fostered a new sense of American
interdependence and identity. In any new imperial crisis, American Patriots
would for the first time be able to formulate a coherent and unified policy of
resistance.
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The Tea Act and the Outbreak of Fighting
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As Patriots warned fellow
colonists of the dangers of imperial domination, Lord North lent substance to
their predictions. He wanted to assist the East India Company, which had
incurred great military expenses in expanding British trade in India. To do so,
he secured the Tea Act in 1773, which eliminated the customs duty on the
company’s tea and permitted its direct export to America. The company’s tea,
although still subject to the Townshend duty, would be cheaper than the
smuggled Dutch tea most Americans drank. If the colonists bought it, however,
they would be accepting the duty. Beyond that, American merchants would lose a
valuable trade, because the company planned to sell its tea through its own
agents.
Lord North knew that the
Tea Act would be unpopular in America, but he was determined to uphold
parliamentary supremacy. When a shipment of tea arrived in Boston, radical
Patriots led by Samuel Adams prevented its unloading. When Governor Hutchinson
refused to permit the tea to be reexported, the Patriots, many disguised as
Native Americans, threw the cargo overboard in the so-called Boston Tea Party
in December 1773.
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Britain Stands Firm
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Events now swiftly moved
toward the outbreak of war. An outraged Parliament demanded compensation for
the tea. The Boston town meeting, now under the influence of the radical Caucus
Club led by Adams and Joseph Warren, rejected this demand. The North ministry
replied with a series of stern edicts in March 1774. These edicts, along with
the Québec Act, a measure passed by the British Parliament at the same time,
were known among the colonists as the Intolerable Acts. The port of Boston was
declared closed; the powers of the Massachusetts assembly and local town
meetings were curtailed; and two acts provided for the quartering of troops in
private houses and the exemption of imperial officials from trial in
Massachusetts. The ministry’s strategy was to use the destruction of tea to
isolate what the British saw as the radical Massachusetts Patriots from more
moderate Americans in Virginia and the mid-Atlantic colonies.
The British strategy of
dividing the Americans nearly succeeded. Colonial leaders met in the First
Continental Congress, held in Philadelphia in September and October 1774. In a
pamphlet titled A Summary View of the Rights of British America,
intended to influence the Virginia delegates to the Congress, Thomas Jefferson
denounced all parliamentary legislation as acts “of arbitrary power ... over
these states.” A much more conciliatory attitude was reflected in a plan
presented by Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania. Galloway proposed the creation of
an American parliament that would have significant powers of taxation and
legislation, but whose acts would need the approval of a governor-general
appointed by the Crown. Galloway’s plan was rejected by a narrow vote. The
delegates then adopted policies favored by more radical Patriots, including a
petition to the king called the Declaration of Rights and Grievances. The
Congress declared the British reform program “unconstitutional, dangerous, and
destructive to the freedom” of America. More important, it voted to establish a
Third Nonimportation Movement. To implement this boycott, which included
pledges against exportation and consumption as well as importation, the
Congress created a Continental Association—a system of local committees to
mobilize patriotic fervor. Among these local committees were the Committees of
Correspondence and the Committees of Safety. These measures were to remain in
effect until all colonial grievances had been addressed.
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Lexington and Concord
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The British government
remained firm in the face of American resistance. Early in 1775 orders were
sent to General Gage, who at the time was governor and military commander of
Massachusetts. He was ordered to close the Massachusetts assembly, which was
then meeting illegally outside Boston; to arrest its leading members; and to
capture the arms being stockpiled by the colonial militia. On April 19 Gage
ordered his troops to Concord. They were opposed first at Lexington and then at
Concord by colonial militia, who had been warned by Patriots, including Paul
Revere. At Lexington, shots were fired, but the British continued on to
Concord. There they were harassed by American militia shooting from behind
trees, hedges, and buildings. The British were forced to retreat, and they
headed back to Boston in disorganized flight. The battle was a strong American
victory. As the British retreated to Boston, they suffered more than 270
casualties. The colonists lost fewer than 100 people.
Too much blood had been
spilled to allow a peaceful compromise. A final “Olive Branch Petition”
approved by the Second Continental Congress in July 1775 was rejected by the
king. In December, Parliament passed the Prohibitory Act, which outlawed trade
with the rebellious colonies and set up a naval blockade. Consequently, when
Anglo-American philosopher Thomas Paine asked in the pamphlet Common Sense
(published in January 1776) whether “a continent should continue to be ruled by
an Island,” only a minority of Loyalist Americans were willing to defend the
connection with Great Britain. As a series of military skirmishes fostered the
growth of American patriotism, the Continental Congress took the final steps.
In June 1775 it had commissioned George Washington to organize and lead a
Continental Army. In addition, the Congress ordered publication on July 4,
1776, of a Declaration of Independence, which recounted the grievances against
Britain and declared the colonies free and independent as the United States of
America.
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