CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

I

INTRODUCTION

Cuban Missile Crisis, major confrontation between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that occurred in 1962 over the issue of Soviet-supplied missile installations in Cuba. Regarded by many as the world's closest approach to nuclear war, the crisis began when the United States discovered that Cuba had secretly installed Soviet missiles able to carry nuclear weapons. The missiles were capable of hitting targets across most of the United States. The discovery led to a tense stand-off of several days as the United States imposed a naval blockade of Cuba and demanded that the USSR remove the missiles.

II

BACKGROUND

The crisis was the culmination of growing tension between the United States and Cuba following the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The revolution ousted Cuba’s dictator, Fulgencio Batista and brought to power a government headed by Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro.

Prior to the revolution, the United States had had significant influence in Cuba’s economic and political affairs, but the Castro government refused to be influenced by the United States. Castro also caused concern in the United States when he confiscated property belonging to wealthy Cubans and foreigners in an attempt to implement policies to improve conditions for poor and working-class Cubans. Many of these properties belonged to businesses owned by U.S. companies.

Fearing that Castro would establish a Communist regime in Cuba, the United States applied economic pressure, and in 1960 implemented an embargo that cut off trade between the United States and Cuba. Castro refused to give in to the pressure. He responded by establishing closer relations with the Communist government of the USSR. At the time, the USSR and the United States were engaged in the Cold War—an economic, military, and diplomatic struggle between Communist and capitalist nations.

In an effort to topple Castro’s government, the United States trained and armed anti-Castro Cuban exiles living in the United States. The exiles invaded Cuba in 1961, with a landing at the Bay of Pigs. Castro’s army easily defeated the exiles. His victory during the Bay of Pigs Invasion solidified Castro’s control over Cuba. Most Cubans resented U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs and they rallied behind Castro, who declared that Cuba was a Communist nation.

III

THE CRISIS EMERGES

In 1960, as tensions mounted between Cuba and the United States, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev began planning to secretly supply Cuba with missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads to most parts of the United States. Khrushchev mistakenly assumed that the United States would take no action.

By 1962, however, concern was growing in the United States over reports that the USSR was channeling weapons to Cuba. In September, U.S. president John Fitzgerald Kennedy warned the Soviets that “the gravest issues would arise” should they place offensive weapons (a phrase widely understood to mean nuclear weapons) in Cuba.

On October 14 U.S. spy planes flying over Cuba spotted the first ballistic missile. On October 16 U.S. intelligence officials presented Kennedy with photographs showing nuclear missile bases under construction in Cuba. The photos suggested preparations for two types of missiles: medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) able to travel about 1100 nautical miles (about 2000 km, or 1300 mi) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) able to reach targets at a distance of about 2200 nautical miles (about 4100 km, or 2500 mi). These missiles placed most major U.S. cities—including Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York City—within range of nuclear attack. Kennedy also saw evidence of nuclear-capable bombers.

Kennedy now faced a situation with potentially grave consequences. However, he had no clear choice on the actions to take against the Cubans and Soviets. He knew that an attack on Soviet installations in Cuba risked touching off a global nuclear war that would result in the loss of millions of lives. At the same time, he thought, and repeatedly said, that he also risked war by doing nothing. If he ignored Soviet defiance of his pledge in September to oppose offensive weapons in Cuba, then all U.S. pledges might become suspect.

A U.S. promise to defend the beleaguered city of West Berlin in Germany was already under severe pressure. Following the allied victory in World War II (1939-1945), Berlin had been divided into East Berlin, controlled by Communist East Germany, and West Berlin, governed by capitalist West Germany. Earlier in the year Khrushchev had threatened to take over West Berlin and told Kennedy he was willing to bring the matter to the point of war. Khrushchev set a deadline of November 1962 for the resolution of the issue.

Before the Cuban missile crisis began, Kennedy and his advisers believed U.S. nuclear superiority would deter any aggressive Soviet moves. But when the photographs of the missiles arrived, Kennedy and his experts agreed that the weapons might have been placed in Cuba to keep the United States from going to war over West Berlin. For Kennedy, doing nothing about the missiles would only increase the danger in another war-threatening crisis later in the year, this time over Berlin. The dilemma, as Kennedy understood it, was acute.

IV

DEBATING THE OPTIONS

Kennedy quickly assembled a small circle of advisers, including both national security officials and others whose judgment Kennedy prized. On October 16, the first day of the crisis, Kennedy and almost all of his advisers agreed that a surprise air attack against Cuba—followed, perhaps, by a blockade and an invasion—was the only reasonable response.

On October 18, however, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson suggested that Kennedy announce a blockade as a prelude to an air strike. Kennedy’s advisers supported a blockade, but not all for the same reasons. One group saw the blockade as a form of ultimatum. Unless Khrushchev announced he would pull the missiles out of Cuba, the blockade would be followed very shortly by some kind of military action. Another group saw the blockade as an opening to negotiation. After his advisers debated the options, Kennedy decided to go ahead with the blockade. At the same time, the U.S. military began moving soldiers and equipment into position for a possible invasion of Cuba.

Before Kennedy publicly announced the blockade, he wanted to prepare both military and congressional leaders. On October 19 he met in the Cabinet Room with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president’s military advisory group. The Joint Chiefs favored an air strike and an invasion, but Kennedy rejected their proposal, stating that an invasion could escalate into a nuclear war. Kennedy met with congressional leaders on October 22. The legislators' opinions mirrored those held by Kennedy and the majority of his advisers.

Following the meeting with congressional leaders, Kennedy went on worldwide radio and television and announced the discovery of the missiles. He demanded that Khrushchev withdraw them and said that as a first step he was initiating a naval quarantine zone around Cuba, within which U.S. naval forces would intercept and inspect ships to determine whether they were carrying weapons. Kennedy warned that if Khrushchev fired missiles from Cuba, the result would be “a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”

Because international law defines a blockade as an act of war, Kennedy and his advisers decided to refer to the blockade as a quarantine. The United States was supported by other members of the Organization of American States, an organization of nations in the western hemisphere that seek to cooperate on matters of security and economic and social development.

V

WAITING FOR WAR

The first days after the speech were consumed with tension as Kennedy waited to see whether the Soviet ships would respect the blockade or trigger a military confrontation at sea. For several tense days Soviet vessels en route to Cuba avoided the quarantine zone, and Khrushchev and Kennedy communicated through diplomatic channels. This cautious action postponed any confrontation between the U.S. Navy and the Soviet freighters or the Soviet submarines escorting them.

On October 26 Khrushchev sent a coded cable to Kennedy that seemingly offered to withdraw missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade the island, a pledge Kennedy had already volunteered more than a week earlier during a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. Before Kennedy and his advisers could react, Khrushchev delivered a public message in which he linked the withdrawal of the Cuban missiles to the removal of “analogous” U.S. weapons in Turkey along the southern border of the USSR. Khrushchev may have been emboldened to make this added demand by the fact that the United States allowed some Soviet-bloc ships to pass through the blockade. None of Kennedy's top advisers valued the U.S. missiles in Turkey, which were considered obsolete. However, nearly all of them counseled against removing the missiles in response to a Soviet demand, a demand they thought was made in bad faith to derail any solution.

Meanwhile the United States faced the difficult problems of maintaining the blockade and keeping track of the Soviet missiles, which were camouflaged and moved soon after Kennedy's speech. Low-flying U.S. surveillance aircraft encountered hostile fire, and on October 27 the Cubans shot down a U-2, killing its pilot. The Kennedy administration debated the question of whether or not to retaliate by destroying some air defense sites in Cuba, but retaliation ran the risk of killing Soviet advisers and thereby escalating the crisis.

Kennedy sensed that the U.S. public would support removing the missiles in Turkey, but he did not want to appear to be capitulating to Khrushchev's demand. Finally Kennedy decided his public reply would only address Khrushchev's first message, which offered to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a pledge not to invade Cuba.

At the same time, however, Kennedy planned to privately assure Khrushchev that he intended to remove the missiles in Turkey. The president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., to convey the president's pledge and its terms. If the Soviets disclosed the assurance or intimated that the missiles in Turkey were part of the bargain, the missiles would not be withdrawn, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin. He also warned the Soviets that time was running out and that the president would soon feel compelled to attack Cuba.

By the time he received Dobrynin’s report, however, Khrushchev had already decided to remove the missiles because the danger of nuclear war was too great. Cuban leader Fidel Castro had sent Khrushchev a message saying Castro believed a U.S. invasion was imminent and that Khrushchev should be ready to launch the missiles. Khrushchev decided that Kennedy was serious and that an air attack on Cuba and an invasion were at hand. Khrushchev told his ministers that the missiles must be withdrawn from Cuba in return only for a noninvasion pledge.

VI

RESOLUTION

On October 28 the tension began to subside. In a worldwide radio broadcast Khrushchev said he would remove “offensive” weapons from Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade. He also called for United Nations (UN) inspectors to verify the process. Kennedy believed Khrushchev was sincere, but many of Kennedy’s advisers remained wary of the Soviets' intentions.

A further problem developed when Castro refused to allow UN oversight of the dismantling process. Eventually an agreement was reached: The bombers would be removed within 30 days, and the missiles and other “offensive” weapons would be evacuated in the open so that U.S. surveillance aircraft could observe their removal.

VII

CONCLUSION

In the years since the crisis, more details about the incident emerged from declassified U.S. and Soviet files; from conferences involving those who participated in the crisis, including some Soviet officials; and from the release of secretly recorded White House tapes of the meetings involving Kennedy and his advisers.

The facts that came to light revealed that a U.S. invasion of Cuba might have met more opposition than the United States expected. Unknown to the U.S. government, Soviet forces in Cuba had been equipped with nuclear weapons intended for battlefield use. The United States had also incorrectly estimated the number of Soviet troops stationed in Cuba. Instead of a few thousand troops, there were about 40,000 Soviet soldiers in Cuba. Any U.S. invasion would have faced stiff resistance.

The Cuban missile crisis was a very dangerous episode, bringing the world’s major military powers to the brink of nuclear war. Kennedy has been criticized for such policies as the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, which helped cement the Soviet-Cuban relationship and led Khrushchev to think Kennedy might be bullied. Yet most historians agree that it was Kennedy's good judgment, and the prudence Khrushchev displayed once the crisis intensified, that helped avert catastrophe.

The crisis led to a temporary strain in relations between the USSR and Cuba. Castro felt he had been unfairly excluded from the negotiations over the fate of the missiles, which he thought Cuba needed to discourage a potential invasion from the United States. However, with the threat of invasion removed by the U.S. pledge and with Cuba badly in need of Soviet financial aid, relations between Cuba and the USSR soon grew closer.

The apparent capitulation of the USSR in the standoff was instrumental in Khrushchev's being deposed as leader of the USSR in 1964. The younger Soviet leaders who ousted Khrushchev perceived his action during the crisis as weak and indecisive. This perception, combined with other foreign policy setbacks and difficulties meeting his goals for domestic programs, contributed to his removal from power.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the point at which the Cold War began to thaw. Both sides had peered over the precipice of nuclear war and wisely decided to retreat. Khrushchev eventually accepted the status quo in West Berlin, and the predicted conflict there never materialized. The thaw also led to the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 by Britain, the United States, and the USSR. The treaty outlawed nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere or underwater, but allowed them underground.